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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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The size, interdependencies, and complexity of Navy software intensive warfare 
systems are continuing to rapidly increase. Numerous studies and reports indicate 
that the majority of DoD/Navy warfare system development efforts are failing to 
consistently successfully deliver high quality software systems on schedule and 
within budget. This paper provides several examples of successful development 
efforts that utilized Naval Surface Warfare Center (WC) in-house expertise to 
successfully deliver open architecture (OA)–based multi-system and multi-platform 
capable software systems with reusable components. This paper also provides 
insight into how government in-house software expertise can be utilized to mitigate 
many of the documented software system acquisition challenges that prevent the 
successful development and delivery of high quality software systems on schedule 
and within budget. 
Introduction 
The definition and goals of OA within this paper means designing and implementing 
software-intensive systems that are scalable, reliable, portable, maintainable, modular, and 
reusable; and thereby lead to high system quality while also reducing cost and schedule. As 
shown in Figure 1, the DoD/Navy is not consistently delivering high quality OA warfare 
systems on schedule and within budget. This paper will provide insight into how several 
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Figure 1. Typical Warfare System Acquisition Results 
Current State: Development Approach and Results 
This section provides a high-level overview of the typical software intensive system 
acquisition development approach and results. 
In the typical software system acquisition approach, the government leads the initial 
identification of the needed warfighter capabilities but relies almost entirely on industry 
experts for the system and software architecting, designing, and implementation. 
Government engineers do not actually architect, design, nor develop any of the actual 
system and software components.  Government insight into the architecture, design, and 
implementation is provided by a few software SMEs that participate during the reactionary 
(vice proactive) process of peer and milestone reviews.  Following the system design and 
development performed by industry, the government then leads the system testing and 
certification efforts with industry being responsible for assessing and resolving problems 
found during system testing.  The frequent unsuccessful results of this acquisition approach 
are well documented in reports from organizations such as the Defense Science Board 
(DSB) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).  Figure 1 reports the following 
statistics: 
  In 2002, the DSB Task Force on Defense Software reported that only 16% 
are completed on schedule and within budget; 31% of programs are 
cancelled; 53% of the programs remaining have cost growth greater than 
89%; and the average final product includes only 61% of the original intended 
features. 
 In 2004, the GAO reported that the DoD spent 40% of its software 
development budget reworking software because of quality related issues 
(GAO-04-393, March 2004). 
 In 2008, the DSB reported that the majority of DoD weapons systems are 
failing Initial Operational Testing. 
 In 2009, Senator Carl Levin reported that since 2006 nearly half of DoD’s 
largest acquisition programs have exceeded Nun-McCurdy, and that 95 major 
defense programs have had their acquisition costs grow by an average of 
26% and have experienced an average schedule delay of almost two years. 
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Future State: Challenges and Improvement Goals 
Figure 2 summarizes some of the key challenges and improvement goals for 
software intensive warfare system acquisition programs. The primary challenge is to 
consistently successfully deliver high quality, secure and safe software intensive weapon 
systems that fully meet the needs of the warfighter.  Achieving OA systems will improve 
system quality, promote competition and innovation, and thereby reduce cost and schedule. 
Achieving OA systems and benefits is complicated by having to integrate rapidly evolving 
system and software technologies into existing large complex systems composed of varying 
levels of legacy technology while maintaining Information Assurance (IA). As demonstrated 
by the success examples in the next section, one approach to meet these software system 
acquisition improvement goals is to utilize in-house experts with the applied system and 
software engineering technical expertise, experience, and corporate knowledge required to 
successfully team with industry to achieve non-proprietary OA systems. 
 
Achieve Open Architected (OA) systems with reusable components
Meet warfighter and taxpayer needs and expectations
Reconstitute and maintain government technical expertise, corpor ate 









- Rapidly delivering systems on schedule and within budget that meets warfighter needs 
- Achieving Open Architected (OA) systems with reusable components
- Integrating rapidly evolving software technologies into large,  complex legacy (old technology) systems 
- Maintaining Information Assurance (IA)
- Maintaining government corporate knowledge and control of system architecture and components
 
Figure 2. Challenges and Improvement Goals 
Warfare System Development Success Examples 
This section will provide several examples of software system development efforts 
that have resulted in high quality multi-platform capable systems with reusable components 
that have been consistently delivered within cost and schedule constraints. The common 
and significant contributing factor to the success of these warfare system development 
efforts is that government technical subject-matter experts were responsible for actually 
leading and developing some of the critical requirements, architecture, design, and software 
elements of these systems. Utilization of government expertise has been consistently 
successfully utilized by the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) for 
various strategic and tactical warfare systems. NSWCDD government software engineers 
have been, and still are, responsible for the architecting, designing, coding and testing of 
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many of the most critical and complex (e.g. safety critical, real-time, complex algorithms) 
software components. The successful utilization of warfare center in-house experts has 
been utilized in various system development approaches that include: 
 teaming with industry as part of an integrated system development team, 
 prototyping and development of the initial engineering development module, 
and 
 rapid development and delivery of reusable architectures or components. 
The following specific success examples of the different uses of in-house expertise 
are provided in the next sections: 
 Tomahawk Cruise Missile Weapon Control System (TTWCS), 
 Generic Data Extraction, Analysis and Reduction (GeDEAR) Framework, and 
 Cooperative, Communications, Control Core Engagement (4CE) framework 
for the Full Spectrum Effects Package (FSEP) and Gunslinger Package for 
Advanced Convoy Security (GunPACS) sniper sense, track, and engage 
systems. 
The previously mentioned development efforts successfully achieved the following: 
 delivered reliable, maintainable, scalable and reusable architectures, design, 
and code that provide multi-platform and/or multi-system capability. 
 successfully integrated a mix of legacy components, new commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) components, and government engineer developed reusable 
architectures and components, while maintaining Information Assurance (IA). 
 successfully met complex, real-time, safety critical functional requirements 
and the associated challenging Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). 
 maintained government corporate knowledge and control of the system 
architecture, design, and technology. 
 maintained government applied technical expertise with current and emerging 
system and software technologies, methodologies, processes, and tools. 
 delivered these systems on schedule and within budget. 
Success Example 1: Tomahawk Cruise Missile Weapon Control System (TTWCS) 
The Tomahawk Cruise Missile system has performed exceptionally well in thousands 
of operational events, and as noted in the 2004 GAO report on Defense acquisition, the 
Tomahawk Cruise Missile program was cited as one of the few successful  DoD warfare 
system acquisition programs.  
The current Tomahawk Cruise Missile system is composed of three major segments: 
the Tomahawk Command and Control System (TC2S), The Tactical Tomahawk Weapon 
Control System (TTWCS), and the All-Up-Round (the missile). The TTWCS segment is 
developed by an integrated government and industry development team. This integrated 
team approach has been successfully utilized since the early 1980s and is still employed 
today. The government and industry integrated development team  (IDT) has succeeded in 
developing common reusable software components to support multiple Tomahawk firing 
platforms (United States submarine and surface ship variants, as well as United Kingdom 
Royal Navy submarines).  As shown in Figure 3, the government engineers architected, 
designed, developed, and delivered the multi-platform capability via object-oriented design 
and implementation techniques at the Object/Class Level within one of the major TTWCS 
Computer Software Configuration Items (CSCIs).  
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Over the past several decades, the TTWCS IDT has consistently successfully delivered 
software upgraded to incorporate and integrate the latest technologies.  Examples include 
the evolution from Mil-spec processors (ROLM 1666) to modern processors (HP744, X86), 
from mil-spec operating system (RMX/RDOS) to open system OS (LINUX), and from first 
generation programming languages (Assembly, Fortran) to modern languages (Ada, Java, 
C, C++).  The design approach taken by the IDT has resulted in the development of a 
common baseline of TTWCS software that is installable on all platform variants.  This 
approach significantly reduces the amount of software code that must be maintained over 
the lifecycle of the product, resulting in a reduced number of defects delivered to the fleet 
and a significant reduction in out-year sustainment costs.   
The IDT has successfully incorporated new system/software development 
methodologies including the transition from functional design to object-oriented design, from 
waterfall development to spiral/increment development; from human-only generated coding 
to graphic-user-interface and auto-code generation tools, and from point-to-point interfaces 
to FDDI/ETHERNET H/W employing IP-based communications using Service Oriented 
Architecture standards.  
The TTWCS IDT has achieved and demonstrated OA design and implementation.  As 
shown in Figure 3, the TTWCS government software engineers utilized object-oriented 
design to achieve scalability and reusability with regards to the goal of easily interfacing with 
multiple platforms and their unique launching systems.  The TTWCS has been easily 
upgraded to support not just U.S. surface ship vertical launching systems, but also U.S. 
submarine and United Kingdom Royal Navy submarine platforms.  As the TTWCS has been 
upgraded to interface with the new platform launching systems, the government software 
engineers were able to define the software requirements and architecture, document the 
design modifications, implement and perform software level testing for the associated new 
launcher interface typically within a year timeframe.  Reuse of existing software objects from 
the TTWCS software have been successfully integrated into  new launching system 
software components contributing to reduced development time and reduced cost. The 
Navy’s new surface combatant (Zumwalt Class Destroyer) is employing the above 
mentioned approach to integrate Tomahawk capability on that platform type. 
For nearly 30 years, the development team responsible for the Tomahawk Weapon 
Control System has successfully met interdependency deliveries and provided the fleet with 
a reliable, high-quality product.  The software quality of the TTWCS software has been 
consistently high with the integrated software for currently deployed systems averaging 
approximately one Defect/KSLOC, which compares favorably with available industry data. 
The TTWCS software developed by the government and industry team has consistently met 
all Key Performance Parameters (KPP) identified in its Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD) and, most important, has performed exceptionally well in tactical operations. 
 =
=












Surface Platform Launcher A
Surface Platform Launcher B
Submarine Platform Launcher N



















SW REUSE & 
MULTI-PLATFORM
CAPABILITY ACHIEVED 





Figure 3. Tomahawk Multi-Platform Design 
Success Example 2: Generic Data Extraction, Analysis and Reduction (GeDEAR)  
The GeDEAR effort is an example of a software component that was successfully 
architected and implemented entirely by in-house experts to be easily integrated and utilized 
within different programs and systems. The GeDEAR framework has proven to reduce cost 
and schedule by providing a robust utility for quickly identifying the root cause of defects. 
GeDEAR 
 allows for integration of a software-based data extraction capability into a 
system with minimum cost or schedule impacts; 
 works across many different data formats and interfaces through the use of 
plug-ins; 
 supports a wide range of platforms and operating systems; 
 provides a foundation for common data extraction, reduction, and analysis 
tools; and 
 is freely available on forge.mil. 
Figure 4 provides the architecture of GeDEAR, which enables users to utilize all or 
any of the three major components (Management Console, Extraction Server, and 
Reduction Program) to provide an integrated data extraction and analysis capability within 
their tactical, training or test system and software. GeDEAR utilized open architecture 
design to eliminate hardware, operating system dependencies, interface dependencies, and 
utilizes a plug-in design to enable users to quickly integrate and tailor the GeDEAR utility to 
meet the specific needs of the given system. 
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Figure 4. GeDEAR Multi-System Design 
To date, the government expert developed GeDEAR component has been quickly, 
easily, and successfully integrated into the following systems: 
 Tomahawk Weapon Control System (TWCS): 4 Week Effort. TWCS is an 
existing system and incorporated only the Reduction Program component of 
GeDEAR.  The use of GeDEAR required the development of several plug-ins 
to the Reduction Program to modify the output of the reduced data and a 
small program that converted the file that describes how the events are 
structured from their legacy format to the GeDEAR format. 
 Ship Protection System (SPS): 3 Month Effort. SPS was a new development 
effort and incorporated the entire GeDEAR framework.  The use of GeDEAR 
required the development of a plug-in to the Extraction Server to allow it to 
automatically capture DDS traffic on the network and extract this information. 
 Advanced Multi-Configuration Environment Simulator (AMES):  1 Month 
Effort. 
 AMES is an existing system and incorporated the entire GeDEAR framework.  
The use of GeDEAR required the modification of how events were being 
extracted within tactical software and the updating of event definition files. 
Success Example 3: Cooperative, Communications, Control Core Engagement (4CE) 
Framework 
4CE is an example of utilizing government expertise and resources to rapidly 
develop and delivery critical systems to the warfighter. 4CE is an example of a successful 
OA based multi-platform and multi-system software framework. Government engineers have 
teamed with industry to utilize agile software development methodology to successfully 
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deliver the integrated sensor and weapon capabilities for Marine Corps and Army vehicles 
such as Gunslinger, Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP), and Wolfpack.  
This integrated agile development team has also been utilized for the Naval 
Expeditionary Overwatch (NEO) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
systems.  These rapid development efforts were led by government engineers who quickly 
assessed and integrated multi-vendor hardware and software technologies to provide the 
deployed warfighters with much-needed capabilities that met emergent mission critical 
needs for the Navy, Marine Corps and Army. 
This framework and its precursors have been used to deploy several vehicles to Iraq 
and soon Afghanistan.  The Gunslinger vehicle deployed to Iraq for eight months.  The three 
FSEP vehicles were deployed to Iraq in January 2007 and two are still in operation.  
GunPACS’ four vehicles will deploy this year to Afghanistan. The urgent need for these 
systems made it necessary to produce these systems in a year or less.  Therefore, 
minimizing redundant effort became of utmost importance. 
Despite developing systems for various military Services and vehicle/vessel 
platforms, there were many opportunities for code reuse and architecture abstraction.  
Regardless of the program sponsor or user, all systems were encapsulated into three layers 
of abstraction, which are as follows: 
 Presentation Layer—GUI, mapping engine, and video situational awareness. 
 Middle Layer—behaviors, algorithms, and logic. 
 Hardware Layer—interface with COTS and GOTS hardware. 
As shown in Figure 5, the 4CE framework was developed to enable the reuse of 
these three layers.  It was also developed to enable the fast integration of new sensors into 
the hardware layer.  In the past, integrating a new sensor could take two to three months 
since software developers had to significantly modify code through all three layers.  
However, with the use of standard interfaces between layers and modularization, sensor 
integration was reduced to weeks and in some cases just a few days.  The 4CE framework 
now provides a common software platform for all rapid integration projects. 
 
Figure 5. 4CE Multi-Platform Multi-System Architecture 
The value of this common software platform includes    
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 increased code reuse, 
 improved quality, 
 shortened development cycle, 
 rapid integration, and 
 efficient developer resource utilization. 
As shown in Figure 6, the single greatest benefit of the 4CE framework is the ability 
to deliver more capability for less cost and time.  This agile software development team, in 
its early days, would surge to as many as 17 developers and a development duration of 
around one year.  Conversely, as the 4CE framework matured, software development could 
be characterized as a 2–4 person team working for 3–6 months. 
The value of this architecture and model for rapid integration and deployment has 
been further proven with the Command Control Module (C2M) project.  NSWCDD will be 
developing a Technical Data Package and partner with industry to produce ~750 counter-
sniper systems for the Army.  In a possible second phase NSWCDD will team with an 
industry partner to produce another ~2000 systems. 
 
Figure 6. 4CE Reduced Development Time and Resources 
As shown in Figure 7, the next stage in the evolution of 4CE is to increase its open 
architecture characteristics and transition to a service-oriented architecture (SOA)-based 
system.  Moving to a SOA will separate capabilities and functions into services provided 
over a bus.  In the current state of 4CE it is possible to compete out hardware plug-ins for 
new sensors.  The transition to the SOA based arch will facilitate the plug-in and third-party 
integration in the Middle Application and Presentation Layers. 
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Figure 7. Future 4CE Architecture 
Key Factor for Warfare System Development Success  
A key factor in the previous success examples was the applied knowledge of the 
government SMEs at the lowest, most detailed levels of system abstraction. Although 
software has evolved into one of the most significant, complex, and critical elements of 
mission critical systems, the typical DoD/Navy acquisition strategy tends to treat the 
software components as black boxes with the internal software architecture and design 
development (and detailed understanding) left almost entirely in the hands of private 
industry SMEs. Figure 8 depicts a typical software intensive system with hundreds of system 
level requirements, interfaces, and components. This same system decomposed at the 
software level may include 
 hundreds to thousands of software level requirements, 
 hundreds to thousands of internal and external software interfaces, 
 hundreds to tens of thousands computer software components (CSCs), 
 thousands to tens of thousands internal software interfaces and interactions,  
 millions to hundreds of millions of logic threads, and 
 millions to hundreds of millions of source lines of code (SLOC). 
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Figure 8. System and Software Complexity 
The current typical acquisition approach often limits the government’s technical 
understanding to a few pages of high level system and software architecture diagrams.  The 
government understands and “controls” the interfaces between the software components 
only at the highest level of system abstraction. There is often limited government in-depth 
understanding of the architecture, design, and implementation of the software level 
components. The government SMEs are limited to participation via milestone review events 
(e.g., Requirement Reviews, Design Reviews, Test Readiness Reviews, etc.).  Limiting 
government SME to just oversight roles and only milestone review event participation is 
ineffective for ensuring that the software components and artifacts fully meet the OA 
objectives of modularity, scalability, reliability, maintainability, and quality, it does not ensure 
that the implementation artifacts (i.e., code) and design artifacts remain consistent with each 
other. 
As demonstrated by the success examples in the previous section, government and 
industry technical teams can be successful. Under this alternative acquisition approach, the 
government engineers serve as the technical lead for critical components, which includes 
being responsible for not just assessing industry developed architecture, design, and code 
artifacts, but actually developing a subset of the artifacts. The artifacts (requirement specs, 
design documents, code, etc.) are developed by integrated government and industry 
software development teams that utilize cross-organizational design/code peer reviews to 
ensure high-quality products and conformance to best-practices.  Government system, 
software and test SMEs are responsible for developing and delivering a subset of the 
mission critical tactical system and software components and the associated technical 
artifacts, including requirements specifications, architecture, and design and interface 
documents, code, and test procedures.  
The government software development engineers have the same expectations and 
requirements relative to cost, schedule, and technical performance as their industry peers. 
The government SMEs are also responsible for providing the critical management products 
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as well including development process documents, metrics, schedules, progress indicators, 
interdependencies, and risks. This is required to develop and maintain in-house SMEs with 
the applied technical and programmatic experience required to be able to both successfully 
develop the system components and manage (accurately estimate and track cost, schedule, 
and risk) the development effort at all levels of the system decomposition (functional 
domain, component, segment, CSCI, and down to the CSCI sub-component object and 
class level).  The following elements are critical for enabling success: 
 A common set of industry and government processes and expectations, 
 Well-defined, documented and maintained  
o roles and responsibilities; system development processes and 
metrics; cost, schedule, and performance expectations; Integrated 
Master Schedule (IMS); interdependency products and associated 
delivery dates; and risk management. 
 Proactive integrated management of cost, schedule and performance. 
 Government test team is independent from the government development 
team. 
 Milestone reviews that include independent competency experts. 
 Frequent (daily) and structured open team communication. 
Integrated Government and Industry Development Team Benefits 
This section describes the benefits of utilizing the expertise still available at the Navy 
Warfare Centers as part of a government and industry software intensive system 
development team. This alternative approach benefits the System Program Offices, the 
Industrial Base, and the warfighter.  
In 2008, the ASN/RDA Software Process Improvement Initiative (SPII) Software 
Acquisition Management (SAM) focus team published a report that described the following 
critical problems that apply to the vast majority of DoD/Navy software intensive system 
program acquisition offices:  
 lack of effective management, 
 immature acquirer (program offices), 
 ineffective requirements management, 
 high personnel turnover, 
 unrealistic cost and schedule estimates, 
 ineffective utilization of Earned Value Management System (EVMS) for 
software, and 
 failure to utilize lessons learned. 
The utilization of in-house technical expertise has been demonstrated to mitigate the 
problems mentioned previously and provide the following benefits to the program offices: 
Program offices will have access to in-house experts with the technical and 
acquisition process experience to aid the program offices in successfully managing the 
integrated government and industry development teams. 
 The in-house experts will have the applied knowledge to assess industry 
technical approaches and also their software development processes.  This 
includes having in-house experience and historical metrics from system and 
software cost and schedule estimates and will be able to provide support for 
independent cost and schedule assessments. 
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 The in-house experts will have applied experience developing and 
implementing system requirements at all levels, which will enable them to 
support program office requirement management and volatility risk reduction. 
 The government engineers will have in-depth knowledge of various weapon 
system architectures and maintain the corporate knowledge required to 
mitigate the risk of program office leadership and personnel turnover, as well 
as changes in the industry development organizations. 
 The in-house engineers will have applied experience with EVMS and can aid 
the program offices in setting up realistic and meaningful based software 
EVMS processes and tools. 
 By maintaining engineers with applied experience in both previous and 
current complex development efforts, the program offices will have a source 
of objective lessons learned and metrics that can be applied to future 
development process improvement. 
 Maintaining a team of in-house experts provides the program office with 
leverage over the contractor if the contractor is failing to meet program cost, 
schedule, or technical performance requirements. The program office 
leadership will have the option to augment the industry software team with 
on-site government software engineers, or transfer the responsibility for 
software component development from industry to government.  This can be 
accomplished easily as the government software engineers are part of the 
software development team from the beginning.  There will be no need to 
perform a costly re-competition to assign the work to another private industry 
team that would be unfamiliar with the program requirements and plan. 
 Maintaining an experienced government software development organization 
mitigates the impact of program office leadership changes.  Acquisition 
program office leadership transition may occur at any point during the system 
development effort. The system development organizations are faced with 
the challenge of still meeting the previously defined development milestones 
and delivery dates, while simultaneously changing organizational structures, 
reporting chains of command, tasking priority changes, funding reallocations, 
and development process changes directed by the new leadership.  The 
experienced government development team can provide the following 
benefits to the acquisition office’s new leadership: 
o Maintains critical corporate knowledge in order to aid the new 
leadership in quickly coming up to speed on the history of the 
program, the system’s architecture and functionality, the various 
development organization’s roles and responsibilities, current 
development process, and status of the current development efforts 
(schedule, progress, and risk). 
o Provide impact/risk assessment for new organizational or process 
changes. 
Senior DoD/Navy system acquisition leaders have expressed the need to 
reconstitute and maintain in-house technical expertise. The government cannot attract the 
best talent, nor sustain highly motivated and high-quality SMEs by limiting their tasking to 
looking-over-the-shoulders of industry engineers. By assigning actual system and software 
development responsibility to in-house engineers, the government can reconstitute and 
maintain the software expertise pipeline, as shown in Figure 9, and thereby develop the 
senior-level expertise required to perform as technical and programmatic peer level 
teammates with industry. 
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Computer SW Configuration Item (CSCI) Level
Segment and Component Level 
SOS AND COMPLEX SYSTEM LEVEL
-Architect and Design Complex Systems
-Assess and/or Provide Technology Approaches
-Assess and/or Provide Cost and schedule Estimates





Level of Responsibility 
SW Sub-Components
Gov’t hands-on software development is required to:
•Maintain expertise with the latest software technologies
•Attract the best software engineers
•Serve as a smart buyer and successfully team with industry
In-House Software Subject Matter Experts
 
Figure 9. Government Expertise Pipeline 
The successful systems described in the previous section assign government SMEs 
responsibility for software architecture, design, code, and test responsibility and thereby are 
able to consistently achieve the following: 
 Maintain awareness and expertise in modern software technologies and 
methodologies necessary to understand and determine when/if/how these 
new technologies should be utilized. 
 Successfully designing and implementing truly OA systems that fully meet the 
goals of standardized interfaces, scalability, reliability, portability, modularity, 
and reusability; thereby leading to higher system quality while also reducing 
cost and schedule. 
 Successfully integrating the complex mix of legacy software components, 
new COTS software and hardware components and DoD/Navy developed 
highly specialized software components to provide integrated net-centric 
systems that can execute as systems-of-systems and fully meet mission-level 
objectives and KPPs. 
 Successfully assessing and rapidly integrating the most advanced software 
technologies and methodologies into the software development processes, 
environments, and systems.  
Strengthening the government in-house SME also benefits the industrial base, as 
industry will have a smarter buyer of warfare systems, which enables the following: 
 The government will have technical SMEs with the continuing corporate 
knowledge and system expertise to provide industry with better requirements 
to enable more accurate cost/effort responses to Requests For Proposals 
(RFP). 
 The in-house SMEs will be better able to assess industry technical and cost 
proposals. Contacts will be awarded on true best value (not just the lowest 
bid). The SMEs will have the expertise to validate that a contractor’s higher 
cost is fair and value added as the technical and development processes 
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reflect current best-practices and meet the goals of non-proprietary OA based 
development. 
 During development, the industry SMEs will have peer government SMEs 
that work proactively (versus reactively via just milestones reviews) to ensure 
sound technical approaches and acceptable technology/programmatic risk 
identification and mitigation. The government SMEs will have in-depth 
understanding and early insight into industry design/implementation to enable 
early risk identification and mitigation (e.g., accurately assess Technology 
Readiness of industry technical approaches). 
 The resulting increase in quality and reduction of schedule/cost failures will 
increase industry profit by enabling the team to spend dollars on new 
capabilities and production versus fixing significant numbers of defects. 
 The government SMEs will have an understanding and control of the 
overarching system architecture and resulting system artifacts and thereby 
enable an approach of contracting out smaller system components. This 
promotes more competition and enables smaller businesses to obtain 
contracts. 
 Most important, this alternate approach has proven to better meet the needs 
of the warfighter by providing high quality and reliable systems that meet the 
warfighter’s needs. 
Summary/Recommendations 
Figures 10 and 11 summarize the typical and alternative system acquisition and 








• Non-open, proprietary systems
• Cost and schedule overruns
• Limited capability
• Poor quality software







Figure 10. Typical Acquisition Responsibilities 
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• Open Architected Systems
• Non-proprietary systems
• Manageable cost variances
• Manageable schedule variances
• Maximized capabilities
• High quality software









Figure 11. Alternative System Acquisition Responsibilities 
As directed in the 2008 Mr. Donald Winter SECDEF memo,   
This combination of personnel reductions and reduced RDT&E has seriously 
eroded the Department's domain knowledge and produced an over-reliance on 
contractors to perform core in-house technical functions.  This environment has 
lead to outsourcing the "hands-on" work that is needed in-house, to acquire our 
nation’s best science and engineering talent and to equip them to meet the 
challenges of the future Navy.  In order to acquire DON platform and weapon 
systems in a responsible manner, it is imperative the DON maintain technical 
domain expertise at all levels of the acquisition infrastructure. 
The common critical factor in the success of the development efforts described in 
this paper was the utilization of government technical SMEs with hands-on expertise and 
development responsibilities. 
The DoD/Navy must re-assume leadership of the system and software architecture 
and design. Government software architecture and technical authority must be 
demonstrated not just at the highest system composition level but must extend down into 
detailed software component levels as well. In order to attract and keep the best and 
brightest SMEs, the government must offer: 
 challenging development and leadership responsibilities, and 
 opportunities of architecting, designing, and implementing solutions to 
complex system functional capabilities and problems that address warfighter 
needs. 
The DoD/Navy should increase the utilization of integrated government and industry 
technical development teams in order to develop truly open architected systems and thereby 
achieve the goals of delivering the warfighter with high-quality systems on schedule and 
within budget. 
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